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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
current law upon the point in this jurisdiction, for, in the
words of the trial judge, quoted with approval by the Court
of Appeals:
"'After all is said and done, a water-front develop-
ment cannot be a water-front development without a
water-front'."'16
THE EFFECT OF AN ENCROACHMENT ON
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY ON THE
MARKETABILITY OF TITLE
Sinclair v. Weber'
On November 30, 1951, the defendant entered into a
contract to purchase the improved property on the north-
east corner of Greenmount Avenue and Old York Road
when it was put up at auction by the agent of the plaintiffs.
The contract memorandum consisted of a sales agreement,
part of which said:
"I having had the same opportunity as others to
examine the property, agree to pay for same and take
title with all its faults and errors of description, it being
understood that the Auctioneers have made no war-
ranty or representations whatever, except that the title
must be found merchantable."2
The defendant, a real estate broker whose business con-
sisted of buying property for rent or resale, was given
immediate possession. The defendant's attorney engaged a
registered surveyor to survey the land. The surveyor's plat,
dated January 8,1952, showed an encroachment of one wall
of the building beyond the building line of Greenmount
Avenue from five to thirteen inches. It was shown at the
trial that the encroachment had existed for at least fifty
and probably one hundred years. It was also shown that
the Waverly Building Association had loaned money on the
property, after approval of the title by its attorney. No
evidence was introduced to show that anyone had known
1* Supra, n. 1, 292. For other Maryland cases involving easements implied
by reference to a plat, or by language in a deed calling the lot conveyed to
bind upon an unopened sheet see the following: White v. Flannigan, 1 Md.
525 (1852) ; Pitts v. Baltimore, 73 Md. 326, 21 A. 52 (1891). For an early
case refusing to apply the doctrine because of the parole evidence rule see
Howard v. Rogers, 4 H. & J. 278 (Md., 1817).
'204 Md. 324, 104 A. 2d 561 (1954).
2 Ibid, 329-330.
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of the encroachment prior to the survey of January, 1952.
It was testified that the average pedestrian would not notice
the encroachment.
The defendant's attorney notified the plaintiffs that he
considered the title to the property unmarketable due to
the encroachment, and later notified them by letter, dated
January 18, 1952, that he repudiated the contract and
demanded return of the $1500.00 deposit made at the time
of the auction. The plaintiffs refused to return the money
and on June 5, 1952, instituted this suit for specific per-
formance of the contract, in the Circuit Court of Baltimore
City. The trial court held that the contract did not comply
with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and did not
consider the other defenses of laches and lack of marketable
title.8 The Court of Appeals after holding the memorandum
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, remanded the
case with directions to enter a decree of specific perform-
ance, holding the title marketable and the plaintiffs not
guilty of laches.
This note is concerned only with the marketability of
real property where the improvements encroach upon a
municipal street. Marketability of title is dealt with in
Hewitt v. Parsley4 where this Court said:
"'Every purchaser of land has a right to demand a
title which shall put him in all reasonable security, and
which shall protect him from anxiety, lest annoying, if
not successful suits, be brought against him, and prob-
ably take from him or his representatives land upon
which money was invested. He should have a title
which shall enable him not only to hold his land, but to
hold it in peace; and if he wishes to sell it, to be rea-
sonably sure that no flaw or doubt will come up to dis-
turb its marketable value'."
and in a later case' said:
"A title, to be marketable, need not be free from
every conceivable technical criticism; objections which
are merely captious, although within the range of
possibility, should be disregarded by the Court."
The plaintiffs contended that the encroachment was so
slight as to come under the rule of de minimis non curat lex.
I Merchantable title is synonomous with marketable title; 57 A. L. R.
1253, 1284; Horton v. Matheny, 72 Oh. App. 187, 51 N. E. 2d 41, 44 (1943).
'101 Md. 206, 209, 60 A. 619 (1905).
Zepp v. Darnall, 191 Md. 68, 73, 59 A. 2d 744 (1948).
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However, a New York case6 held that where a brick build-
ing encroached in a street from 2/3 of an inch to 2 inches
the doctrine of de minimis can have no application to the
removal of brick facing from a substantial building.
The plaintiffs also contended that since there were a
large number of similar encroachments all over Baltimore
City which the City had never disturbed, the marketability
of the title had not been interfered with. They quoted this
Court's holding in an earlier case, Baldwin v. Trimble:'
"Whilst an encroachment on a highway is conclu-
sively settled in Maryland to be a public nuisance
which can never grow by prescription into a private
right,.. .yet it may be true and in perfect harmony
and accord with that doctrine, that cases, concerning
public streets can arise of such a character and founded
upon an actual and notorious abandonment of the
highway by the public, that justice requires that an
equitable estoppel shall be asserted even against the
public in favor of individuals."
It is submitted however, that this earlier case was one in
which several buildings had been built right on the site
of an old road and the Court said:8
"There is no evidence that this road was ever laid
out by Municipal authorities, or that it was ever ac-
cepted by them or kept in repair at the public expense."
Plaintiffs also relied upon United Finance Corporation v.
Royal Realty Corporation' where the Court said:
"But whether the basis for the relief be called
equitable estoppel, or abandonment and reverter, is a
mere matter of terminology of little relative import-
ance, except to the verbal precisian. For in any case
it involves the principle that one who, having an ease-
ment of way, whether public or private, suffers his
right to lie fallow and unused for a long period of time,
and throughout the period suffers the owners of the
servient tenement not only to use it as though no such
right existed, but actually acquiesces in such use by
taking taxes or other charges assessed against it or
profits therefrom as though no such easement existed,
or by permitting any uses of the land inconsistent with
Perlman v. Stellwagon, 115 Misc. Rep. 6, 187 N. Y. S. 845, 845 (1921).
'85 Md. 396,402, 403,37 A. 176 (1897).
'Ibid.
'172 Md. 138, 147, 191 A. 81 (1937).
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the existence of the easement, may be held to have
sufficiently manifested such an intention of abandon-
ing the right as will estop him from asserting it."
The facts were that the municipality in that case had never
taken the land in question for the roads mentioned. The
general rule, of course, is that a city, having an easement
for public use cannot grant, nor a property owner acquire,
any right in the street which would interfere with the
public use.10 One Florida case" clearly supported the plain-
tiff's argument. One corner of a building overhung a public
alley for "less than one foot", another corner of a different
building overhung the alley more than one foot, a roof
overhung the sidewalk for more than one foot and a porch
extended into the alley four inches. The Florida Court said,
after a review of the aiithorities, that to render title un-
marketable the encroachment of buildings over public
ways:
".... must be of such a substantial nature as to inter-
fere with the normal use of public way on or over
which it encroaches and in addition thereto there must
be a strong likelihood that the vendee would be sub-
jected to litigation concerning it or be required to
move it."' 2
The Court of Appeals in upholding the contention of
plaintiffs distinguished the New York case of Acme Realty
Co. v. Schinasill wherein it was said that show windows,
oriel windows, a portico projecting beyond the building
line one foot, and a stoop projecting four feet, all subject
to removal by the proper municipal authorities rendered
the title to an apartment building unmarketable and sub-
ject to rejection by the prospective buyer. The Court
pointed out that the New York case was not analogous,
because of a recent change in New York policy, made neces-
sary by the growing density of population and the spread
of business into residential districts, of ordering the re-
moval of similar long-standing encroachments on wide
residential and business streets. In the instant case, the
Assistant City Solicitor who was head of the Real Estate
Division of the City Law Department testified that there
were many encroachments throughout the city, but that
10 Jennings v. Bauman, 214 App. Div. 361, 212 N. Y. S. 334, 336 (1925).
n Loeffler v. Roe, 69,So. 2d 331 (Fla., 1953).
Ibid, 339.
" 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577 (1915).
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the policy of the city was to let them remain if they did not
materially interfere with the public use of the sidewalks.
The Court in the instant case was not referred to, and
did not cite, the New Jersey case of Vassar Holding Co. v.
Wuensch,'14 closely analogous in point of fact, in which,
despite an encroachment of only an inch to an inch and a
half, the court held that it rendered the title unmarketable.
The New Jersey Court said:
"The question for the court is, not the extent of the
encroachment, but whether there is one in fact that
makes the title unmarketable. The statement of coun-
sel that the city has never taken steps to remove the
encroachment has no bearing on the question. Nullum
tempus occurrit regi. It may assert its right at any
time, and should it do so the front of the.., building
would have to be altered."
Thus New Jersey advocates a more strict view, and one
which would have supported the position of the defendant
in the instant case. It is doubtful, however, whether the
outcome would have been changed because the New Jersey
view was referred to by the Court of Appeals in the Trimble
case. 5 Moreover, in the New Jersey case there was testi-
mony that the encroachment had made the title unmar-
ketable in at least two prior instances, while in the instant
case a member of the bar had passed the title, on the
strength of which a building association had loaned money
on the property. Writers on this subject have this to say:
"Whether or not an encroachment on a public street
of a building situated upon land sold by executory
contract affects the marketable quality of the title de-
pends largely upon the character and extent of the
encroachment and the laws of the municipality where-
in the property lies."' 6
In general there are two views, the stricter being repre-
sented by the Vassar Holding Co. v. Wuensch, 7 where it
was held that any encroachment interfered with the mar-
ketability of title. This seems to be based on the right of
the city to compel the removal of an encroachment at any
time regardless of the extent of the encroachment or the
14 100 N. J. Eq. 147, 135 A. 88, 89 (1926).
rnSupra, n. 7.
1155 Am. Jur. 708, Vendor & Purchaser, Sec. 255, pointing out further that
the policy of the municipality is to be given weight.
'7 Supra, n. 14, as well as the other jurisdictions cited in Baldwin v.
Trimble, 8upra, n. 7, 402.
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length of the period of adverse use or possession. Then
there is the other view followed here and in the Florida
case. 8 This rule may be stated thus: The marketability
of a title is not interfered with unless there is a substan-
tial encroachment that interferes with the public use of
the way, or unless the city policy can be established as
requiring the removal of all such encroachments. The New
York and Maryland Courts differ not in the law, but in its
application because of the widely different municipal poli-
cies involved as to encroachments on city streets.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF REPLICATION
TO PLEA OF LIMITATIONS
Piper v. Jenkins'
This is an action of deceit arising out of the purchase of
a house and lot by plaintiffs. The declaration, filed on
February 18, 1954, alleges that on October 22, 1947, the
plaintiffs entered into a contract for the purchase of the
land, which was conveyed to them by deed dated November
19, 1947; that prior to the contract the plaintiffs had in-
spected the land in company of one of the defendants, who
had pointed out to them a garden, surrounded by rocks,
lying about twenty-five feet east of the house; that the de-
fendant had specifically represented that the east boundary
of the lot ran approximately one foot east of the east
boundary of this garden, but that in February, 1952, the
plaintiffs discovered that both the north and south lines of
their house projected beyond the true east boundary of the
lot. Plaintiffs alleged that the representation was material
and had been made falsely, or with a reckless disregard for
its truth or falsity, and claimed damages. In addition to
the general issue, defendants filed a plea of limitations.
Plaintiffs filed a replication thereto claiming the defen-
dants' fraud had kept them in ignorance of their cause of
action. A demurrer to this replication was sustained by
the lower court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.'
In the course of the opinion, before reaching the problem
of the legal sufficiency of the replication, the Court of
Appeals made several interesting rulings. They pointed out
that a vendor of land can be held liable for a misrepresenta-
tion of the boundary made with knowledge of its falsity or
8Supra, n. 11, as well as the jurisdictions cited in Baldwin v. Trimble,
supra, n. 7.
1113 A. 2d 919 (Md., 1955).
However, the case was remanded with leave to amend.
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